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Predictive Analytics, Watson, and Cybersecurity: Beyond *Jeopardy!*

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Cybersecurity Ideal: A Strong Deterrence

- **Ultimate prevention depends upon an ability to deter the attacker**

> **Deterrence: T**he attempt to prevent or forestall undesired activity through influencing an attacker's or potential attacker's perception of the gain-loss balance

- **Relies upon prevention, detection, response, and recovery**
- **Both policy and technology based**
  - Willingness to respond in a meaningful, targeted way
  - Must have a range of responses built and ready to use
  - Must be able to deploy with pinpoint accuracy
- **Goals**
  - Reduce likelihood of success
  - Increase the attacker's "cost"

Elements of a Contested Cyber Environment[1]

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

[1] 2008 AFSAB report "Defending and Operating in a Contested Cyber Domain"

Example of Attack Trajectories[2]

Counterfeit CISCO 1721 Router
1/5 of cost of original
2002-2007
FBI Report, January 2008



1. **Find distributors for counterfeit equipment**
2. **Sell equipment to targeted place**
3. **Scan network**
4. **Plant malware**
5. **Stay hidden**
6. **Perform attack on mission**

Attack trajectories are dynamic:

- **Depend on target and choose the least resistance**
- **May leave out layers (such as network layer)**
- **May change dynamically by reacting to defensive actions**

[2] 2008 AFSAB report "Defending and Operating in a Contested Cyber Domain"

Defining Terms: Adaptive and Predictive



Predictive Analytics in Cybersecurity

- **Role of Predictive Analytics**
  - Set and modify defensive configurations based on a threat model or simulation
  - Guide system owners on preemption and deterrence posture
  - Quantify the impact of different system tradeoffs

- **Issues in building Models and Classifiers**
  - Target system modeling
    - Massive data scale, heterogeneity, and streaming issues
    - Knowledge acquisition in dynamic environments
    - Situation awareness barriers (sensor placement, encryption, noise/deception)
    - Abstraction to appropriate system metrics
  - Human organization modeling
    - Attacker's camouflage, C2/OODA loop
    - Target organization's vulnerabilities
  - Modeling of hardware, materials, devices, communication links
  - Acquiring training data
    - Modeling normalcy vs. modeling attack behavior

Resilient Cyber Systems

- **Today's Cybersecurity Reality**
  - Software complexity guarantees vulnerabilities
  - Unknown network, system, and human-system configurations
  - Attacker advantages in time, location, and target
  - Low cost of entry and limited ability to identify the perpetrator

- **Given sufficient time and resources, any perimeter and system can be breached**

- **Resilient Systems for Cyber Defense:** PNNL's ARC initiative
  - Modeling problem is hard, but not as hard as pure prediction
  - Still require many of the same kinds of models
    - System models: configurations, connections, normal/abnormal use
    - Attack models: attack vectors, vulnerabilities, targets, attack goals
    - Resilience models: resilience resources, task importance, possible workflows
  - Not a solution for privacy and data exfiltration

We still need effective predictive models and classifiers

Watson for *Jeopardy*: Key Features





- **IBM Jeopardy Power7 cluster**
  - 2880 POWER7 cores at 3.5 GHz
  - 16 Terabytes of memory
  - 80 Teraflops, #94 on Top500
  - ~$3 million
  - Run DeepQA in <3 sec
- ***IBM Journal of R&D*, May 2012**

- ***Jeopardy's* central graph**
  - Metric: be in the winner's cloud
  - Multiple DeepQA systems at different levels of performance
  - Constant testing
    - ~40K official *Jeopardy* QA pairs
    - New QA pairs easy to create
    - Decomposable metric
    - Factoid answers

Lessons From Watson

- **Recognition that *Jeopardy* could be modeled**
  - An empirically-grounded model of 100s candidate Q-A pair types
  - A learned model of the ability of each solver to accurately answer a question type
  - A complete model of the Jeopardy rules, objectives, and buzzer management
  - An large but incomplete model of needed domain knowledge
  - Needed knowledge is static and mostly available

- **Key Watson Innovations**
  - Software Engineering : high-speed iteration and competition through a complex parameter space vs. “the BOGSAT design method”
  - Question-Answering Architecture: Build a haystack, then find the needle vs. “1-5 carefully designed algorithms to rule them all”
    - Not classical forward-chaining or backward-chaining
  - Embrace Data Heterogeneity: Language-based interlingua vs. fixed database schema or pre-built formal ontology

Responding to Watson in Cyber Analytics

- **Software Engineering**
  - Adequate system simulations to test/iterate on, including system/context dynamism
  - Tractable system metrics (parallel to the winner's cloud)
  - Appropriate and redundant system sensors and attack/failure/degradation detectors
- **Security Analytics Architecture**
  - Overgenerate security hypotheses, filter, rank, and check
  - Decompose attack signatures into detectable atomic components, recompose detections into threats
  - Uncertainty management and ranking
- **Embrace Data Heterogeneity**
  - Base of models and data sources is "all of the above"
  - Can the language of cybersecurity work as a non-brittle KR in this application?

Beyond Jeopardy: Watson for Cyber?

- **Use Predictive Analytics to enhance resilience, rather than fight the attack as it happens**

- **Cybersecurity Analytics with a Watson Architecture**
  - Situation awareness and system metrics from streaming data
  - Decompose security analytics to independently-solvable components
    - Multiple independent solvers that can each contribute “factoid” system hypotheses
    - Standing task-based resilience queries that can combine solver outputs
  - Maintain multiple active threat/failure hypotheses and likelihoods
  - Parallelism for speed of response

- **Challenges**
  - Creating and maintain the necessary models using streaming data
  - Uncertainty management and scenario ranking
  - Creating and building 100s of “solvers” that together build the haystack
  - Tractable account of resiliency, system tasking, and degradation

Thank You